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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
OREGO·N SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

7701
THE DENVER AND RIO GRAND·E
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and

App~ellant.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Oregon Short Line Railroad 'Company brought this
action to condemn a right of way over the track and right
of way of The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company at the point fixed by order of Public Service
Commission of Utah, which order was upheld by this Court
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in The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company

v. Public Serv·ice Commission of Utah and Union Pacific
Railroad Company, 2-30 P. (2) 55,7 (not officially reported).
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company alleged, in paragraph 1 of its complaint that it was engaged as a common
carrier for hire in the public transportation of persons
and commodities of all kinds within the State of Utah and
all other States (R. 1) . This was denied (R. 8). Also at
pretrial it insisted that it was at that time a common carrier (R. 22).
The undisputed evidence shows that Oregon Short Line
Railroad Company is a Utah corporation organized before
1900 as a railroad corporation but that it has not operated
as a common carrier in any particular since January 1, 1'9:36
(R. 85, 90, 96, 97, Ex. C). On that date it leased its entire
property, both real and personal, to Union Pacific Railroad
Company for one hundred years, with provisions for extensions of such lease for an indefinite period thereafter
(R. 85, Ex. C). On that day also Union Pacific Railroad
·Company assumed all Oregon Short Line Railroad ~Company
rates (R. 129, Ex. L). Since that date Oregon Short Line
Railroad Company has had no tariffs or schedules establishing any rates for the carriage of passengers or freight
in interstate or intrastate commerce filed with Interstate
Commerce Commission or Public Service Commission of
Utah (R. 129) and therefore could not and cannot haul
passengers or freight as a common carrier without violating the provisions of Sec. 6, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the
Transportation Act of 192:0, 49 U. S. C. A., pp. 2~36-238,
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and Sec. 76-3-2, U. C. A. 1943, and being subjected to criminal penalties under those laws (R. 128).
Since January 1, 1936, Oregon Short Line Railroad
Company has not carried any freight or passengers or engaged in any activities whatever as a common carrier (R.
85, 90, 96, 97, Ex. C). It has no superintendent, trainmasters, roadmasters, section foremen, engineers, firemen,
conductors, brakemen, sectionmen, or any other officers,
agents or employees (R. 90, 96, 97), excepting only F. C.
Paulsen (General Manager of Union Pacific Railroad Company at Salt Lake :City), who is also General Manager of
Oregon Short Line Railroad ,Company but whose sole function as such has been and is the signing of leases for ·Oregon
Short Line Railroad Company (R. 87, 88).
In this state of the record the court should have found,
concluded and adjudged as set forth in the Statement of
Points upon which appellant intends· to rely for reversal
of the judgment.
1. The District Court should have found in
accordance with the uncontradicted evidence that
plaintiff and respondent is not and has not been
since January 1, 1936, engaged as a common carrier
for hire in any transportation of either persons or
commodities in Utah or elsewhere.
2. The District Court should have found in
accordance with the uncontradicted evidence that
plaintiff and respondent is not engaged in rendering any public service at this time and has not been
since January 1, 19-36, and that there is no reasonable prospect that it will be so engaged at any time
in the future.
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3. The District Court should have concluded
that plaintiff and respondent is not entitled to condemn a crossing over the property of defendant and
appellant because plaintiff and respondent is not
engaged in the rendition of any public service.
4. The judgment is. against law because plaintiff and respondent is not engaged in the rendition of
any public service and therefore has no right of
condemnation.
These four points involve a single question of law.
S'TAT·EMENT OF P·OINT u·PoN WHICH APPELLANT RELIES FOR REVERSAL O·F JUDGMENT.

A CORPORATION D·OES NOT HAVE THE
P·O'WER OF EMINENT DOMAIN AS A RAILRO·AD ·CORPO·RAT'ION UNDER U·TA.H LAW
UNLESS IT' IS ENGAGED AS A ·COMMON CARRIER AND THE CONTEMPLA'TED USE IS
P·UBLIC.
ARGUMENT
1. A CORPORATION DO·ES NOT BE,COME A
CO·MMON· CARRIER B.Y LEGIS.LATIVE FIAT,
P·UB.LIC BERVI,CE COMMISSION ORDER OR
BY PROVISIONS O·F ITS C:HARTER. IT MUST
HAVE THE ATTRIBUTES WHI·CH, IN LAW,
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ST'AT·Us. OF ·CO·MMON CARRIE.R.

2. UNDER T'HE UT'AH STATUTES AND
·CASES T·H·E TAKING MUST BE FOR A PUBLIC PURP:OSE.
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3. A RAILROAD COMPANY CANNOT ·CONDEMN LAND FOR USES NOT CONNE·CTED
WITH THE CONDUCT OF ITS. BUSINESS AS
A COMMON CARRIER.

The Utah statutes in regard to eminent domain provide as follows :
Every railroad corporation organized
under the laws of this state * * * shall have
the following powers :
"77 -0-5.

*
*
*
*
"' (3) * * * to condemn in the manner
provided by law a right of way * * *.'
*

" '104-61-1. Subject to the provisions of this
chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

*

" ' ( 4)

*
*
*
*
* * * railroads and street railways

for public transportation.' "
The Constitutional justification for delegating the
power of Eminent Domain to Railroads is that they are
engaged in the public service as common carriers and therefore the property taken would be used for the public.

In re Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108
N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429:;

Elliott on Railroads, 2nd Ed., Sec. 954.
But if the Railroad Company is not a common carrier
or if the particular use for which the property is taken
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is not a public use, that railroad company cannot exercise
the power of eminent domain. And a railroad company
does not become a common carrier merely because its articles of incorporation so state.
1. A CORPORATION DOES NOT BE·COME A
COM MON CARRIER BY LEGISLATIVE FlAT,
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER OR
BY PROVISION8 OF ITS c:HAR'TER. IT· M.UST
HAVE THE AT'TRIBUTES WHICH, IN LAW,
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ST'ATUS 0'F CO·MMON C'ARRIER.
1

McCarthy v. Public Servic·e Commission, 111 Utah 481,
184 P. (2d) 220, (1947). The Public Service :Commission
by its order purported to make common carriers. of truckers whose activities were not those of a common carrier.
It was held that the order was illegal. On page 49'3 the
court said:
"The defendants are rendering a private service to their customers. They are not engaged in a
public service inviting an indefinite public generally
to hire them ; nor does the public have a legal right
to the use of their facilities. There being no evidence
that they have held themselves out to such a public,
the action of the commission in classifying defendants as common carriers was error in law and without proper foundation."
State v. Nelson, 65· Utah 45:7, 23:8 P.

23~.

This case has become a leading case having been cited
by many courts of the country. Nelson had a contract to
carry passengers and baggage between Salt Lake ·City and
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Utah Out-Door Association at Brighton.

The State attempted to enjoin his operation because he had no certificate of convenience and necessity. The court held that he
was not operating as a common carrier. On pages 46,1-462
the court said :

"* * * They all recognize that a common or
public carrier is one who, by virtue of his business
or calling or holding out, undertakes for compensation to transport persons or property, or both, from
one place to another for all such as may choose to
employ him. Running through the cases is a recognition of the dominent element of public· servic·e, serv._
ing and carrying al-l persons indifferently who arpply for passage Orr for shipment of goods or freight.
To .constitute a common carrier such element is also
requisite under the Utilities Act. It defines a 'common carrier,' as the term is used therein, to include
among others every automobile corporation engaged
in the transportation of persons or property for
public service over regular routes between points
within the state and an automobile corporation to
include every corporation or person engaged in or
transacting business of transporting passengers or
freight, merchandise, or other property, for compensation by means of automobiles or automobile stages
on public streets, roads, or highways along established routes within the state. Public servic·e, as distinguished from mere private service, is thus a nec·essary factor to constitute a common carrier. * * *
In other words, the state may not, by mere legislative
fiat or edict or by regulating orders of a commission,
convert mere private contracts or a mere private
business into a public utility· or make its owner a
common carrier. * * * So, if the business or
concern is not public service, where the public has
not a legal right to the use of it, where the business
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or operation is not op~en to an indefinite public, it is
not subject to the jurisdic·tion or regulation of the
commission.''
The Nelson case has received approval in the recent
case of Garkane Pow·er Co. v. Public Service Commission,
9-8 Utah 466, 100 P. (2d) 571. Referring to the Nelson
case the court on page 572 said :
"The distinction there made is valid, and is conclusive of this case. Garkane does not propose to
hold itself out to serve all who apply and live near
its lines; its very charter which gives it existence
restricts its service to a certain group (members).
It dJ.oes not propos·e to serv~e 'the public· generally,'
but only to serve its members."
The Nelson case has been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Frost v. Railroad
C01nmission, 271 U. S. 583, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 46 S. ·Ct. 605,
such citation appearing on page 607.
The Court of Appeals of New York has held that a
railroad corporation must be a common carrier and that
it does not become such merely by so stating in its articles
of incorporation. In In re Niagara Falls and Whirlpool
Ry. Co., 108 N.Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429, the New ~ork statute
authorized condemnation for a right of way by this. railway
which proposed to build along the shore of the Niagara
River to be used for sight-seers during four months of the
year. The court said :

"* * * The right of the state to authorize
the condemnation of private property for the construction of railroads, and to delegate the power to
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take proceedings for that purpose to railroad corporations, has become an accepted doctrine of constitutional law, and is not open to debate. B'ut the
power is dormant until the legislature authorizes its
exercise: and the particula.J· corporation which claims
the right to exe1·cise the power must be able to show
a legisla.tive ·n'arrant, and, that being shown, it must
be able, further, to establish, if the right is challenged. that the particula.r scheme in which it is engaged is a railroad enterprise within the true m..eaning of the decisions whick iustify the taking of private property fo7" railroad purposes; or that the business which it is organized to carry on is public·; and
that the taking of private property for the purposes
of the corporation is a taking for public· use. The
general principle is now well settled that when the
uses are in fact public, the necessity or expediency
of taking private property for such uses by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the instrumentalities to be used and the extent to which such
right shall be delegated are questions appertaining
to the political and legislative branches of the government; while, on the other hand, the question
whether the uses are, in fact,. public, so as to justify
the taking in invitum of private property therefor,
is a judicial question to be determined by the courts.
Beekman v. Railroad Co., 3 Paige, 45; In re Cemetery Ass'n, 66 N. Y. 569; In re Ferry, 98 N. Y. 13-9~..
15·3.
"If the question whether the purposes and objects for which the petitioner, the Niagara Falls &
Whirlpool Railway Company, is organized, are public, so as to justify the exercise in its behalf of the
right of eminent domain, is controlled and is to be
tested exclusively by the description of those objects
and purp-oses as they are set forth in its articles of
association, there coul'd be no hesitation in c·onclwiing that the company is entitled to take the proc-eed-
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ings now in question, unless the particular property
now sought to be taken, is, on special grounds, exempt from ·condemnation. Looking at the articles
of association alone, it appears that the company is
a railroad corporation organized under the general
railroad act for 'public use in transporting persons
and property' by a railroad to be constructed between
certain termini. The papers, on their face, show
that the corporation has undertaken an ordinary
railroad enterprise within the purview of the act of
1850, in aid of which the power of eminent domain
may be appropriately exercised. But, when we look
beyond the formal documents, and the actual business proposed to be conducted is considered, we find
that the proposed railroad has no proper termini;
that it is not a highway in any just or proper sense;
that it cannot, by reason of necessary limitations,
perform one part of the duty it has undertaken, viz.,
the transportation of freight; that, at most, it can
be operated but a portion of the year; and that the
sole object of its construction is to enable the corporation, for a compensation to be received, to provide for the portion of the public who may visit
Niagara Falls better opportunities for seeing the
natural attractions of the locality. We feel constrained to say that, in our judgment, this is not a
public purpose which justifies the exercise of the
high prerogative of sovereignty invoked in aid of
this enterprise. The right of the company being
challenged on this ground, the court is compelled to
consider it, and it is manifest that the inquiry is no·t
precluded because the petitioner has orgunized its·elf
under the general railroad act, and has assumed in
its articles of association the character of an ordtnary railroad corporation. * * * It is especially
necessary that the question .of what constitutes a
public use should not be dealt with in a critical or
illiberal spirit, or made to depend upon a close con-
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struction adverse to the public; but, having these
considerations in mind, we are nevertheless constrained to conclude that the enterprise in question
is essentially private and not public, and that private property cannot be taken against the will of
the owners for the construction of the road of the
petitioner."

Elliott on Railroads, 3rd Edition, Sec. 1204, states the
rule in accordance with the New York case. The author
states:
"Accordingly it has been held that the corporation which claims the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain must not only show a legislative
warrant, but it must be able, further, to establish,
if the right is challenged, that the particular scheme
in which it is engaged is a railroad enterprise within
the true meaning of the decisions which justify the
taking of private property for railroad purposes·;
and that the taking of private property for the purpose to which the corporation proposes to devote, is
a taking for a public purpose."
It is to be observed that the foregoing language is taken
literally from the Niagara case.
2. UNDER THE UTAH STATUTES AND
CASES T·HE TAKING MUST BE FOR A PU·BLIC PURP·OSE.
The Utah statute on eminent domain, Sec. 104-6·1-1,
authorizes the right of eminent domain "in behalf of the
following public uses." In subparagraph (4) appear the
words "and railroads-for public transportation." In Sec.
77-0-5, subparagraph (3), the railroad corporation is given
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the right "* * * to condemn in the manner provided by
law"-this, of course, refers to the general provisions of
the statute relating to eminent domain.
In Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah
201, 77 P. 849, the Supreme ·Court of Utah made the following statement on page 851 :

"* * * The test is, will any and all persons
and business institutions who may have occasion to
do so be permitted to use it? That is, will the track
be open to public use generally? If so, then it is a
public utility. * * *"

In the Stockdale case the Salt Lake ~Council granted a fran-chise permitting the Rio Grande Western to build a spur
from its main line track across the ·city street and sidewalk
and on to the property of a brewing ·company which according to plaintiff would cause vibration and in general
make his property less valuable.

Cereghino v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 26 Utah 467,
7'3 P. 634. The Oregon Short Line proposed to build a spur
across city property to serve the ~Con. Wagon & Machine
Company. It was for purely private purposes. On page 637
the court said :

"* * * The public at large have an interest
in the construction and successful operation of railroads designed for the transportation of passengers
and freight, and because of this interest the defendant railroad company, in common with all others, is
given the right to invoke the law of eminent domain,
and subject private property to its necessary public
uses; but it has no right, either under the law of

eminent do?'JUL,in or a pretende'd framchise from a
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municipality, to directly or indirectly take priva.te
property for the purpose of building a line of railway or a switch track designed and intended) to1 be
used exclusively for the convenience and accommodation of a- private business. And as stated by counsel for the appellant in their brief, 'Neither can it
subject the streets and sidewalks of a municipality,
dedicated to public uses of the people, to additional
servitudes or burdens in aid of private undertakings
and enterprises.' * * *"
The above is a good statement of the law as is shown in 18
American Juris prudence, Section 62 of Eminent Domain,
page 691, where the text reads :

"* * * If a short spur is intended to increase
the general terminal facilities of the railroad, the
fact that it is also to be used for the benefit of a
manufacturing establishment does not prevent its
being for a public use. On the other hand, a spur
track leading from the main line of the railroad to
the establishment or place of business of an enterprise that is wholly private for the exclusive use of
such enterprise is clearly not a public use, notwithstanding the railroad company has the right to use
the spur for general traffic but only to such extent
as will not interfere with the business of the manufacturer. When, however, the branch or spur is open
to public use in the same manner as the rest of the
railroad, the fact that when constructed it will lead
to the works of a single establishment and will probably be used almost wholly by that establishment is
no bar to the acquisition of the necessary land by
eminent domain. * * *"
No~h v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371.
The Supreme ·Court of Utah held that a statute giving
a property owner the right to condemn water for the irrigation of a farm is constitutional because it is a public use.
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The Court said :

"* * * The question before us not only involves the right of the farmer to invoke the law of
eminent domain, when necessary, to enable him to
convey water to his farm, but that of the miner,
manufacturer, and persons engaged in other industrial pursuits to build canals, flumes, and lay pipe
lines over adjoining and intervening lands, when
necessary for the purpose of conveying water necessary for the successful prosecution of their respective enterprises. The future growth, prosperity, upbuilding, and industrial expansion of the state not
only depend upon the storing and holding back the
high and surplus water so they can be used in times
of scarcity, but also in a careful and judicious husbandry of the supply now available; and it is entirely
within the province of the Legislature to enact such
laws respecting the appropriation and distribution
thereof as will tend to prevent unnecessary loss and
waste, so long as vested rights are upheld and maintained. * * * In view of the physical and climatic conditions in this state, and in the light of the
history of the arid West, which shows the marvelous
results accomplished by irrigation, to hold that the
use of water for irrigation is not in any sense a
public use, and thereby place it within the power of
a few individuals to place insurmountable barriers
in the way of the future welfare and prosperity of
the state would be giving to the term 'public use' altogether too strict and narrow an interpretation, and
one we do not think is contemplated by the Constitution."
In Highland Boy Gold Mining Company v. St?·ickley,
28 Utah 2,15, 78 P. 296, the Supreme Court of Utah held
that a statute granting the right of eminent domain for
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the construction of aerial tramways is not unconstitutional
because it is a public use. On page 2H7 the court said :
"The reason for the rule, when applied to the
law of eminent domain, is very apparent, a.s there
are some uses for which private property may be
condemned, the public character of which is so plain
that there is no room for argument; and, on the
other hand, there are innumerable uses for which
property may be and is used, the private character
of which is equally clear and plain. As stated by
counsel for respondent, in their brief: 'Between these
two extremes, however, courts can approach a dividing line "\Vhich is so shadowy that it leaves room
for argument as to whether or not a statute is constitutional. A short distance on either side of the
line the decision is plain, but on the line, and for a
short distance on each side, it is doubtful.' And, as
hereinbefore stated, whenever the court is· in doubt,
it holds the statute constitutional. Therefore, unless
it clearly appears that the use made of the right of
way in question is private and in no sense public,
the validity of the statute must be upheld. Some general rules by which the question as to what constitutes a public use may be determined were declared
by this court in the case of Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah
158, 75 Pac. 3'71. In that case it was in effect held
that when the taking is for a use that will promote
the public interest, and which tends to develop the
great natural resources of the state, such taking is
for a public use."
And on page 29-8 :

"* * *

The m1n1ng industry in this state,
and in others similarly situated, not only produces
a home market for the products of the farm, and
furnishes thousands of men with steady employment
at liberal and remunerative wages, but also produces
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wealth which has enabled other industries to be created and to flourish, which, without the stimulus
thus furnished, would languish. * * *"
For certain purposes such as mining and irrigation the
legislature may grant the right of eminent domain without
the public retaining any right to use the facilities to be
built. That is on account of a high public policy to develop
resources in the state fundamentally necessary to its welfare. It does not follow at all that a railroad is given the
right to condemn property to be used solely by the railroad
or by certain private persons.
Thus in Oregon an easement for a skid road to transport lumber is held not a public use.

Apex Transportation

CoT~~pany

v. Garrbade, 321 Ore. 582,

52 P. 573. On page 574 the court said:

"* * * Under these circumstances, we think
it is manifest that the use to which the plaintiff pro. .
poses to put the land sought to be taken is private,
and not public; and no declaration of the objects· and
purposes of the company in its charter or of the legislature in the act under which it is proceeding, can
give it that character, so as to entitle it to exercise
the high prerogative of sovereignty invoked in aid of
its enterprise. The necessity and expediency of taking private property for public use is a legislative
question; but whether the proposed use is in fact
public is always a judicial question, to be determined
by the courts. * * *"
So also in Washington a logging road \Vas held not a
public use.
Healy Lumber Company v. Morris, 33 Wash.
490, 74 P. 681.
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In both of the Oregon and Washington cases, statute·s
expressly provided that lumbering was a public use and expressly gave the right of eminent domain to persons and
corporations engaged in that industry. California has also
so held in regard to public use.

Amador Queen Mining Company v. D'ewitt, 73
Cal. 482, 15 P. 74;
Hercules Water Company v. Fernandez, 5 ·Cal.
App. 726, 91 P. 401;
Sutter v. Nicols, 93 P. 872, 15·2 Cal. 688;
Stratford Irrigation District v. Empire Water
Company, 111 P. (2d) 957, 44 Cal. App. 61.
1

3. A RAILROAD CO·MPANY CANNOT CONDEMN LAND FOR USES NOT CONNE·CTED
WITH THE CONDUCT OF' ITS BUSINESS AS
A COMMON CARRIER.

Elliott on Railroads, 3rd Edition, 'Sec. 1205, contains
the following statement of the law:

"* * * a railroad company cannot condemn
lands for uses not connected with the conduct of its
business as a common carrier such as the erection
of dwellings for its employees, or the erection of a
manufacturing establishment to supply the road with
rolling stock and other necessary equipment * * *."

Cereghino v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 2;6 Utah 46·7,
73 P. 634;
Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484. At page 49-4, the court
said:
"Although railroad companies must have engines and cars, iron, lumber, wood, and many other
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things in large quantities, in order to build and OPerate their roads, it is supposed they can supply
themselves as private persons do, by purchase in the
ordinary way, and they are not created or designed
to be independent of all other branches of industry
and business in the country, but to be additional aids
to their successful development. The companies must
have shops for the repairs of cars and engines, as
they are so often needed, and as they cannot well be
moved for repairs, nor can facilities be found for
repairs in the country generally, but the company
were already supplied with all necessary accommodations for repairs. We are of opinion that an establishment for the manufacture of ·cars is not a legitimate railroad necessity, so that the company could
properly condemn land on which to erect one.

*

*

*

*

*

"We are of the opinion that the erection of dwelling houses to rent to their employees, is not so for the
use and accommodations of the railroad, as to authorize the seizure of land upon which to erect them,
under any circumstances."

Rensselaer wnd Saratoga R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137.
On page 146, the court said:
"The construction of dwellings for employees or
officers, and the construction of slips for the accommodation of vessels bringing freight to, or taking it
from the railroad company, are not, we think, upon
the proofs before us, necessary corporate purposes
within the statute.

*

*

*

*

*

"It is difficult, as a matter of law, to define by
general statement what purposes are corporate pur-
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poses, or what are the necessary purposes for which
lands may, under this act, be taken; and: probably
the subject is incapable of exact limitation.
"It may however be safely ass·erted that the
acquisition of lands for the purpose of speculation
or sale, or to prevent interference by competing lines,
or methods of transportation, or in aid of collateral
enterprises remotely connected with the running or
operating of the road, although they may increase
its revenue and business, are not such purposes as
authorize the condemnation of private property."
Great Falls Po~ver Co. v. G. F. & 0. D. R. Co.,
104 Va. 416, 52 S. E. 172.

The court refused eminent domain of property for a
park at a terminal. On page 173 the court said:
"It clearly appears that this land is sought by
appellee as a terminal point on account of the rare
scenic features it affords, and because of the attractions it would hold out to pleasure seekers from the
city of Washington. In other respects the location
possesses none of the advantages ordinarily accruing
to a railroad, and but for the beauty of the scene
would most likely have been avoided as. offering no
inducements to such an enterprise. It is further clear
from the record that the quantity of land sought to
be condemned is far beyond any necessity for mere
terminal purposes of an electric railway extending
a distance of 14 miles from the city of Washington.
It is manifest from the evidence that the location
was selected vvith no reference to the public use of
the road in the matter of freight or the _accommodation of the traveling public along the route, but that
the real purpose of the condemnation is to establish
a park overlooking the Great F·ans of the Potomac,
for the comfort and pleasure of sight-seers and cur-
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iosity seekers, and to thereby add to the revenues of
appellee by making the point an attractive place of
resort."

In re Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108
N.Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429.
Respectfully submitted,

VAN ~COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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